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Indian Civil Rights Act Federal Court Cases 1968-1978Below is a list of federal court cases that arose before Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 439 U.S. 49, in 1978. The list is organized into sections and subsections based on the issue involved in the case. Since Martinez, none of these cases are binding on tribal courts, except for habeas corpus cases. Election Controversies
This case was a class action by enrolled members for the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe against their Tribal Council, its Chairman, the U.S. government, and the Secretary of the Interior. The tribal members believed Tribal Council was malapportioned, violating the one-man, one-vote principle and thus their equal protection rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The court remanded the matter to the district court under instructions to determine if a “1972 Eligible Voter List” included all those qualified to vote. If the list was found to be inclusive, the apportionment plan could continue.
To access case, sign up for CaseText for free. The Tribal Council and Chairman of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe appealed a judgment from the U.S. District Court of North Dakota that granted injunctive relief to tribal members concerning the apportionment of voting districts of the reservation. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the Tribe’s plan because evidence of changes in population distribution was lacking. This was a class action brought by members of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe against their Tribal Council, the U.S. government, and the Secretary of the Interior. The tribal members claimed that the Tribal Council was malapportioned given the high number of eligible voters in their home district compared to the lower number of eligible voters in the other districts. Thus, the tribal members alleged the malapportionment violated the one-man, one-vote principle and denied them equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act. The case was remanded with instructions for the Tribal Council to adopt an appropriate reapportionment plan. This case concerned the instructions on remand in Daly, which included the Bureau of Indian Affairs to expeditiously approve any Constitutional amendments that resulted from the reapportionment plan. The Crow Creek Sioux’ reapportionment plan did require Constitutional amendments, and in the plaintiffs’ view, those amendments were not pushed quickly enough by Tribal Council. The court held the Tribal Council did not violate any “orders” from the Daly case as that language was merely a recommendation. The plaintiffs also argued that failure to propose and adopt constitutional amendments in line with Daly constituted a violation of their due process rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The court found that the plaintiffs had not exhausted tribal remedies and dismissed the complaint.
In this case, the primary issue arose out of a Tribal Council election. Three tribal member-plaintiffs were elected but not seated as Council members because a petition signed by other tribal member challenged the election results, alleging that persons under the influence were permitted to vote and elderly person were not adequately assisted. The Tribal Council reviewed the petition, denied the seating of three of the plaintiffs and scheduled a second election. The court found it had jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act and found that the basis for granting a temporary injunction were satisfied. To access case, sign up for CaseText for free. The appellees were write-in candidates for a Tribal Business Council election. Appellees failed to file notice of their candidacies in accordance with the Confederated Tribes of Goshute law. The court enjoined the write-in candidates from taking office and on appeal, the court reversed. The court viewed the issue as one of internal, political tribal matters. Thus, there was no justiciable controversy.
This case concerned an election dispute for the position of President of the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council. The lower court found there was no basis for an Indian Civil Rights Act §1302 claim. Here, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the lower court. The court felt there may be a sufficient claim for denial of equal protection due to alleged intentional interference with the plaintiffs’ voting rights against the Election Board. This case concerned a tribal election on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse reservation. The two plaintiffs ran for positions in tribal government. Williams ran for the position of tribal Secretary but was eliminated in the general election. However, a candidate that advanced plead guilty to a felony, providing cause to remove him from the ballot. He was not removed. The second plaintiff, TwoStars, ran for tribal Treasurer. Ballots were recounted twice, with TwoStars losing by one vote each count. The court denied Williams’ claim because the other candidate was not a convicted felon at the time of the elections and thus, Williams did not suffer injury. The court denied TwoStars’ claim as the burden to show harm was not met.
This case concerned an election dispute among members of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota. The district court ordered the Secretary of the Tribe to issue a certificate of election to the candidates determined by the Election Board to have secured the most votes, except for the candidates from two communities. Certification was required by Tribal Ordinance within three days of the election. Within those three days, the Election Board determined voting irregularities occurred and it would recommend a new general election. However, this determination came after a plaintiff was sworn in (pending certification). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. Originally, this case concerned a series of election on the White Earth Reservation in Minnesota. Ultimately, the election of the Secretary-Treasurer of the Reservation Business Committee was presented for decision. The plaintiffs claimed that procedures employed during the protest hearing and the decision of the Tribal Election Board were violative of due process. The court determined that the procedures were fair, and the decision was rational. Neither actions constituted a violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act. To access case, sign up for CaseText for free. This case concerned a myriad of complaints regarding a Tribal Council election on the Red Lake Reservation. Plaintiffs contended that the election “was fraudulently handled, votes were obtained through bribery, intoxicated persons were permitted to vote, ballots were miscounted and some voters were improperly denied absentee ballots.” Other claims included rigging of voting machines. Some claims were not proven with evidence. The court found that not all tribal remedies were exhausted, and those remedies should be pursued. The court dismissed the complaint. Tribal member-plaintiffs argued that their equal protection and due process rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act were violated when the Tribal Council permitted irregularities in the Tribal Voting Rules and Regulations during a tribal election. Though the plaintiffs identified a number of irregularities, the complaints and other evidence did not show that the irregularities materially or substantially interfered with the results of the election. Thus, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
On multiple bases, the plaintiffs challenged the statutory provision in the Act of April 26, 1906 that provided for the appointment of the Cherokee Principal Chief by the President (as delegated to the Secretary of the Interior). The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that a constitutional challenge to the Act of April 26, 1906 did not provide the court with federal question jurisdiction; the allegedly illegal appointment of Keeler was a matter of intratribal dispute because Keeler’s blood quantum was at issue; and that there was no showing of violation of the “Indian Bill of Rights” under the Indian Civil Rights Act.
In this case, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate and enjoin the membership provision of the Oglala Sioux Constitution. Both plaintiffs sought to run for elections and were disqualified. The defendants’ filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was granted. This case concerned the denial of two Oglala Sioux tribal members, ages 18 and 19, from registering and voting in a tribal election because they were not yet 21 years old. The Tribal Constitution provided that all members over 21 years old and living on the Pine Ridge reservation for one year immediately prior to an election have the right to vote. The court held that the twenty-sixth amendment of the United States Constitution does not apply to internal tribal elections and that the Oglala Sioux Constitutional provision did not violate the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the Indian Civil Rights Act. In this case, the Tribe refused to declare the tribal member-plaintiffs eligible candidates for tribal council membership due to their failure to meet a residency requirement. The plaintiffs argued this violated their rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) §1302(8). The defendants argued that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction. The court found that ICRA provided jurisdiction to the federal district court. However, plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show they were treated differently or unfairly by the Tribal Council. Thus, there was no violation of ICRA. Tribal member-plaintiff was barred for a tribal judge election and a tribal council election because he failed to satisfy a residency requirement. Specifically, the plaintiff challenged the residency requirement section of the Tribe’s Constitution as violative of the Indian Civil Rights Act. However, the main question concerned exhaustion of tribal remedies. The court found that the plaintiff had successfully exhausted tribal remedies even though the plaintiff had not done so at the time of filing in the federal court. To access case, sign up for CaseText for free. The tribal member-plaintiff was not allowed to be a primary election candidate for the position of tribal President. The plaintiff failed to meet the physical residency requirement, which required residency on the reservation one year prior to the election. Though, the plaintiff was not challenging the requirement itself but the application of that standard by the Election Board to his circumstances. Ultimately, the court found the issue moot because the election occurred without any procedural irregularities and the plaintiff did not stay the judgment. Thus, the order in favor of the defendants was vacated and the plaintiff’s complaint dismissed on remand.
This case surrounded the impeachment of Crow Tribal Chairman, Pat Stands Over Bull. Stands Over Bull claimed he was denied due process, as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act, when he was removed from the position. The court found the procedure was not lacking in fundamental fairness, and granted the Crow Tribe’s motion for summary judgment. Tribal Enrollment or Membership Controversies
The plaintiffs were children of an enrolled member of the Colville Confederated Tribe of Indians, who were refused enrollment by the Business Council because they were previously enrolled in another tribe. The plaintiffs alleged violation of their Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) rights to equal protection of tribal law. The only issue was a jurisdictional question. The court found that the lower court did have jurisdiction over the case under ICRA. The court remanded the case.
This case presented the same jurisdictional question as Laramie. The court reversed the trial court’s finding of lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings.
This case concerned Santa Clara Pueblo’s membership ordinance, which denied tribal membership to the children of female members who married outside of the tribe but extended membership to the children of male members who married non-members. The plaintiffs argued that the ordinance violated the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) for failure to provide them equal protection of the law. The court held that suits against the Tribe under ICRA were barred based on sovereign immunity; the ICRA does not impliedly authorize private causes of action against the Pueblo’s Governor; and that ICRA does not give federal courts broad jurisdiction to review tribal government actions in Indian Country, except over habeas corpus actions.
The plaintiffs challenged the application of enrollment standards of the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes. The Tribes required that an application for enrollment be made within two years from the date of birth and require the applicant to have at least one-fourth degree of Shoshone or Arapaho blood. The defendant Tribes moved to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction. The court granted the Tribes motion to dismiss finding no evidence of a denial of due process under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The findings of the Pinnow court were followed in Slattery. The Slattery case also concerned the application of enrollment procedures of the Shoshone and Arapaho. Tribal Council Conduct The plaintiff, a member of the Crow Tribe, alleged due process and equal protection violations under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The plaintiff argued government irregularities caused the harm, including that the Executive Committee of the Tribal Council was illegally constituted, proper notices were lacking, proper quorum was not met, copies of resolution proposal were not provided to elected representatives prior to Tribal Council meetings, and certain resolutions were acted upon without consideration by the Executive Committee in violation of the Crow Tribe’s Constitution. Though the court did not condone actions of the Crow Tribal Council, the court found that the complaint did not state a claim for relief under the ICRA §1302(8) and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.
The non-Indian plaintiff attempted to enter into a contract with the defendant, Crow Creek Housing Authority, for the drilling of three artesian wells for the defendant. The plaintiff did not obtain the defendant’s signature on the contract. When the plaintiff proceeded with the drilling, the defendant prevented the plaintiff from completing the operation. The plaintiff argued that the federal court had jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the suit and dismissed the case. The tribal member-plaintiffs in this suit attempted to assert their right to demand a referendum as the plaintiffs did not approve of the Tribal Council’s resolution that cancelled all debts to the tribal treasury because of the Tribal Rehabilitation Program. The Tribal Council refused to act on the referendum and refused to waive sovereign immunity. The court found that the right to a referendum is secured by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) §1302(8) and that the denial of the referendum as demanded pursuant to the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Constitution was a violation of due process guaranteed by the ICRA. The tribal member-plaintiffs sought an accounting from the Tribe. The plaintiffs moved for default judgment because the Tribe failed to appear. Because the suit did not implicate civil rights and solely the management and accounting of tribal funds, the court found that the federal court did not have jurisdiction over the case under the Indian Civil Rights Act. Exclusion from the Reservation This case concerned the exclusion of the non-Navajo Program Director of Dinebeiina Nahiilna Be Agaditahe, Inc. from the Navajo reservation. The court analyzed the issue under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) §1302 and found the orders of exclusion to be unlawful under the Act. The ICRA protections were determined to be available to non-Indians as well as Indian. Employment Termination Rights
In this case, tribal member-plaintiffs were former tribal government employees under the Community Health Representative Program on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. The plaintiffs were terminated as employees for allegedly participating in political demonstrations during working hours without being granted leave. This violated a Tribal Ordinance. The plaintiffs made free speech, due process and equal protection claims under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) §1302(1) and (8). The court found that the Tribal Ordinance did not violate ICRA free speech protections, and the termination processes did not result in ICRA due process or equal protection violations. This resulted in the court granting the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment was appealed and the case was remanded to the district court.
In this case, the Tribe moved for summary judgment based on the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust tribal remedies. The plaintiffs were former employees of different programs ran by the Crow Tribe. The court found that the exhaustion requirement applied to both tribal administrative and judicial remedies. However, since the tribal court did not have procedures in place to handle this type of case, there was no need for the plaintiffs to exhaust tribal judicial remedies. The status of tribal administrative remedy was unclear. Thus, the court ordered the complaint be dismissed without prejudice to allow for refiling and granted the summary judgment. Tribal Courts
The plaintiff, an Associate Judge of the Fort Hall Tribal Court, sought damages for the deprivation of her rights protected under the Indian Civil Rights Act by the Fort Hall Business Council, Chief Judge of the Fort Hall Tribal Court, and the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. After some incidents with the Chief Judge, plaintiff was removed from her position by the Business Council. Issues of jurisdiction, exhaustion of tribal court remedies, judicial immunity, and conspiracy were raised. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted.
This tort case concerned a car accident that occurred within the boundaries of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation. The appellants were non-Indian residents of North Dakota and the appellees were enrolled members of tribes in North Dakota. The court found there was no basis for federal jurisdiction nor tribal court jurisdiction because the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code only provided for civil jurisdiction over cases brought by a non-Indian against an Indian where the amount in controversy did not exceed $300. Though the court noted this code may violate the Indian Civil Rights Act due process and equal protection provisions, the issue was not reached because it was not raised by the appellants. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe initiated an action against the plaintiffs in tribal court contending that the plaintiffs violated a lease agreement for the plaintiffs use and management of approximately 8,941 acres of land. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the action in Tribal Court, based on lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and appealed the denial of the motion. The plaintiffs then sought relief under the Indian Civil Rights Act in federal court, alleging denial of due process and improper assumption of jurisdiction by the Tribal Court. The court held that the Tribal Court properly assumed jurisdiction. In this case, the district court found it lacked jurisdiction to hear a case concerning an automobile accident on the reservation between two enrolled members of the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe. Solely, the Tribal Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The case was dismissed. In this case, a husband and wife, both members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, divorced. There were two separate orders, from two different Tribal Court judges, as the second judge believed the first judge did not have the authority to make the orders. Under the first orders, the plaintiff-wife was awarded half of the land and cattle accumulated during their marriage. The plaintiff-wife was unable to enforce the decree for years and sought relief from the district court. The narrow question concerned whether the initial Tribal Court judge had the authority to make the orders. The court found that the Tribal Court had jurisdiction to order a division of real property in the divorce decree.
Much of this case concerned a jurisdictional fight between the Montana state courts and the Blackfeet Tribal Court. Here, the grandmother of two tribal children and a Tribal Court Judge appeal the granting of a writ of habeas corpus by the federal district court pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act. The children’s father, and Blackfeet tribal member, filed the habeas corpus petition in the federal district court because he recovered temporary custody of his children and the Tribal Court assumed jurisdiction over the matter and enjoined the children’s removal from the reservation. The court affirmed the granting of the writ of habeas corpus and determined that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over the custody of the children. Tribal Court Criminal Procedures
The appellant in this case was an enrolled Lummi tribal member, who entered a guilty plea for driving a motor vehicle without a valid operator’s license within the boundaries of the Lummi Reservation and filed a writ of habeas corpus under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The issue raised by the appellant was whether he had the right to the assistance of appointed counsel in the criminal proceedings before the Tribal Court. The lower court determined he did not and the appellate court agreed given the language of in ICRA 25 U.S.C. §1302(6).
In this case, a tribal member from the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation appealed the district court’s dismissal of her habeas corpus petition brought under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The tribal member claimed that she was improperly held in state hospital under an involuntary commitment order of the Tribal Court because she was not afforded due process. The district court responded by dismissing the petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies. The court held that the district court erred in requiring exhaustion of state remedies and that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust tribal remedies either because the tribe did not have laws regarding a formal habeas corpus procedure. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case.
In this case, two members of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe filed habeas corpus petitions pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act challenging the vagueness and overbreadth of crimes defined in the tribe’s penal code. The court found the tribe’s disorderly conduct ordinance vague and overbroad according to constitutional standards which were applied in construing Section 1302 of the Indian Civil Rights Act.
This case was a class action suit by Blackfeet tribal members to enjoin the use of the Blackfeet Tribal Jail, to nullify the Blackfeet Tribe’s Law and Order Code, to require tribal judges to grant persons within their jurisdiction the same rights as defendants in state and federal courts enjoy, and to request damages. The defendants, including but not limited to the Blackfeet Tribe, chief of police, and tribal judges, entered a motion to dismiss for want to jurisdiction. The court denied the motion.
This case concerned a member of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe and the fairness of her trial, her due process rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The tribal court judge served simultaneously as judge and prosecutor in her case. The court found that the dual role of tribal judge and tribal prosecutor was violative of due process.
In this case, members of Zuni Pueblo brought an excessive force case under both the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Specifically, the members argued that the tribe violated ICRA by arbitrarily subjecting the plaintiff to unreasonable and excessive force, the tribal officer violated ICRA by subjecting plaintiff to unreasonable and excessive force, and the tribe violated ICRA by negligently hiring and training the tribal officer. The court found that the freedom from excessive force by a government agent is protected by ICRA and money damages are allowable, that the plaintiff can claim money damages from the individual officer, and that the plaintiff may recover damages from tribe caused by negligent hiring.
This case involved the search and seizure of a non-Indian defendant was found guilty of importation and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. The court found that the tribal police officer acted within his scope of authority and that the search of the defendant and the vehicle were reasonable. Property Disputes
This case involved the construction of a factory in an industrial park developed by the Seneca Nation. The plaintiffs had allotment or use rights within the area of the proposed factory. The tribe tried to argue that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The court found that federal courts do have jurisdiction to hear suits against Indian tribes for alleged violations of ICRA. The plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction. The court denied the injunction. The issue in the case was whether under the ICRA there had been a taking by the tribe without just compensation to the plaintiffs. The tribe argued that tribal remedies must be exhausted. The court found that the argument was weak and that the federal court would be entitled to be determine the amount of compensation, even if the tribal court rendered a final judgment.
In this case, a Lower Elwha tribal citizen was assigned a ten-acre tract of land within the reservation for life, which he then leased to another tribal member after consultation with the Chairman. A year later, the Council decided that the tribal citizen effectively abandoned the land assignment despite the lessee paying rent to the tribal citizen and the tribal citizen periodically returning to tend to the land. The Council attempted to notify the tribal citizen of assignment cancellation, without notice and opportunity to be heard. A hearing was scheduled but the tribal citizen was only notified one day in advance. The tribal citizen did not appear at the hearing and another hearing did not occur. The lower court granted the tribe’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The 9th Circuit held the district court could have jurisdiction under the ICRA and remanded the case for further proceedings on the alleged denial of due process. The plaintiff alleged that the Tribe violated her equal protection and due process rights under the ICRA when the Tribe assigned part of her lands to another. The plaintiff was assigned a possessory holding in an 11 acre tract of a 60 acre tract held by her father. This assignment was made under a Land Division Agreement. Subsequently, other heirs of the plaintiff’s father called for an equitable distribution of the 60 acres by the tribal Lands Committee. The Land Committee made a division and assigned each heir a portion. The plaintiff’s 11 acres was reduced to 4.48 acres. The lower court set aside the Land Committee’s determination and ordered the restoration of the plaintiff’s possessory holding in the 11 acres set forth in the Land Division Agreement. The court held that the lower court had jurisdiction to set aside the determination, but the lower court lacked the authority to restore the plaintiff’s holding under the Land Division Agreement. On remand, the tribe was ordered to reconsider the division in line with the parties’ procedural due process and equal protection rights under the ICRA. This case concerned the rescission of a grazing permit by the Tribal Council despite a positive recommendation by the Land and Forestry Committee. The plaintiff inquired into the status of the grazing permit and filed a complaint in the tribal court to no avail. The court found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust tribal remedies, and thus the case was remanded to the Land and Forestry Committee of the Tribal Council to proceed in a full due process hearing and for any adversely affected parties to pursue rights of appeal under tribal law. Should due process not be met, then the court can proceed to hear the merits of the case. This case concerned the foreclosure of a tribal loan to tribal member ranchers, which resulted in the confiscation of cattle, revocation of a grazing permit, and an eviction notice. The court found that the tribal plaintiffs should exhaust tribal remedies. However, the exhaustion requirement is subject to a balancing of the merits of exhaustion against the potential harm of the requirement. In this case, the plaintiffs were denied a tribal liquor license by the Tribe’s Joint Business Council. The plaintiffs alleged the hearing and the denial of the application violated due process and equal protection requirements under the ICRA. This case concerned a member of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe and the fairness of her trial, her due process rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The tribal court judge served simultaneously as judge and prosecutor in her case. The court found that the dual role of tribal judge and tribal prosecutor was violative of due process.
The primary question in this case concerned subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court to hear a dispute over the plaintiff’s right of access to a road which led to an inn/lodge located on his property. The plaintiff previously had permission from six Shoshone tribal members to use the road but did not pursue a formal right-of-way from the tribal members or the Tribe as advised. On opening day, the tribal members with the Joint Business Council, tribal superintendent, and Bureau of Indian Affairs agents barricaded the road. The trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction and in doing so, denied a motion for preliminary injunction. The court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act to review tribal actions and that the Tribe and Tribal Council were not protected by sovereign immunity. |
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